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Abstract
A smart-card-based user authentication scheme for wireless sensor networks (hereafter re-
ferred to as a SCA-WSN scheme) is designed to ensure that only users who possess both a
smart card and the corresponding password are allowed to gain access to sensor data and
their transmissions. Despite many research efforts in recent years, it remains a challenging
task to design an efficient SCA-WSN scheme that achieves user anonymity. The majority of
published SCA-WSN schemes use only lightweight cryptographic techniques (rather than
public-key cryptographic techniques) for the sake of efficiency, and have been demonstrat-
ed to suffer from the inability to provide user anonymity. Some schemes employ elliptic
curve cryptography for better security but require sensors with strict resource constraints to
perform computationally expensive scalar-point multiplications; despite the increased
computational requirements, these schemes do not provide user anonymity. In this paper,
we present a new SCA-WSN scheme that not only achieves user anonymity but also is effi-
cient in terms of the computation loads for sensors. Our scheme employs elliptic curve cryp-
tography but restricts its use only to anonymous user-to-gateway authentication, thereby
allowing sensors to perform only lightweight cryptographic operations. Our scheme also en-
joys provable security in a formal model extended from the widely accepted Bellare-
Pointcheval-Rogaway (2000) model to capture the user anonymity property and various
SCA-WSN specific attacks (e.g., stolen smart card attacks, node capture attacks, privileged
insider attacks, and stolen verifier attacks).
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Introduction
The quest to understand real-world phenomena at a fine spatial-temporal resolution has led to
a great increase in the interest in wireless sensor networks (WSNs). Where not already in place,
a WSN is now being planned and deployed in various application settings such as wildlife mon-
itoring, military surveillance, healthcare diagnostics, and vehicular tracking [1]. Providing an
application service in a WSN environment introduces significant security challenges for the in-
volved parties: sensors, users and gateways. One fundamental challenge is to establish a shared
session key between a sensor and a user in an authenticated manner (known as authenticated
key exchange) via a gateway, and thereby to prevent unauthorized access to sensitive sensor
data and their transmissions. Since sensors have severe resource constraints and due to net-
work characteristics such as unattended operation and unreliable communication channel, au-
thenticated key exchange in WSNs is generally regarded as more challenging to achieve than in
traditional networks with sufficient computing resources and pre-existing infrastructures.
Achieving authenticated key exchange becomes even more difficult when user anonymity is de-
sired. As the concern for privacy increases in our lives, user anonymity has become a vital secu-
rity property in various WSN applications as well as in many other applications like location-
based services, e-voting, mobile roaming services, and anonymous web browsing.
A smart-card-based user authentication scheme for WSNs (in short, a SCA-WSN scheme) al-
lows a user holding its smart card issued by the gateway to achieve authenticated key exchange
with a sensor, preferably in a way that its anonymity is preserved. Since the early work of Das
[2], He et al. [3], Khan and Alghathbar [4] and Chen and Shih [5], all of which provide no key-
exchange functionality, the design of SCA-WSN schemes has attracted much attention from re-
searchers due to their potential to be widely deployed, and a number of proposals offering vari-
ous levels of security and efficiency have been presented [6–20]. Some schemes consider only
authenticated key exchange [6, 8, 9, 12, 20] while others attempt to additionally provide user
anonymity [7, 10, 11, 13–19]. Schemes such as the ones in [6, 12, 20] employ elliptic curve
cryptography to provide perfect forward secrecy while most schemes [7–11, 13–19] use only
lightweight cryptographic techniques, such as symmetric encryptions, message authentication
codes and hash functions, to focus on improving the efficiency.
One common security requirement for SCA-WSN schemes is to ensure that:
only a user who is in possession of both a smart card and the corresponding password can be
successfully authenticated (by the gateway) and access the sensor data.
This requirement is commonly referred to as two-factor security [21–25] and is modelled via
an adversary who is able to either extract all the information inside the smart card of a user or
learn the password of the user, but not both. (Clearly, there is no means to prevent the adver-
sary from impersonating a user if both the information in the smart card and the password of
the user are disclosed.) The former requires physical access to the smart card and then mount-
ing a side-channel attack [26, 27] on the (lost, misplaced or stolen) card, while the latter can be
achieved with shoulder-surfing or by using a malicious card reader. Any attack exploiting the
former ability is commonly called a stolen smart card attack and is considered practical under
the assumption that users’ smart cards are non-tamper-resistant. Accordingly, SCA-WSN
schemes should be designed to achieve their intended security properties, such as authenticated
key exchange and user anonymity, against stolen smart card attacks.
Despite the many research efforts to date, it remains a challenging task to design an efficient
SCA-WSN scheme that provides user anonymity. The recent work of Wang and Wang [28, 29]
shows that, under the non-tamper-resistance assumption of smart cards, no SCA-WSN scheme
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can provide user anonymity without recourse to public key cryptography. This result is some-
what surprising because it implies that all existing anonymous schemes using only lightweight
cryptographic techniques [7, 10, 11, 13–19] fail to achieve user anonymity in the presence of an
adversary who can mount a stolen smart card attack. As an example of such a failure, we here
take the recent SCA-WSN scheme of Jiang et al. [19] which has been presented with a claim of
user anonymity. To illustrate the failure, we only need to examine the user registration and
login request phases of the scheme. LetMK be the master key of the gateway GW, and H be a
cryptographic hash function. Then, the two phases proceed as follow:
User Registration. A user U registers with GW as follows:
1. U chooses its identity IDU and password PWU, generates a random number r, computes
RPWU = H(rkPWU), and submits IDU and RPWU to GW via a secure channel.
2. If IDU is valid, GW generates a temporary identity for U, TIDU, and computes TCU =H
(MKkIDUkTEU) and PTCU = TCURPWU, where TEU is the expiration time of TIDU.
GW then stores (TIDU, IDU, TEU) in its verification table, and issues U a smart card con-
taining {H(), TIDU, TEU, PTCU}.
3. U stores the random number r into the smart card, which then holds {H(), TIDU, TEU,
PTCU, r}.
Login Request. U inserts its smart card into a card reader, and inputs IDU and PWU. The
smart card retrieves the current timestamp TU, selects a random key KU, and computes
TCU = PTCUH(rkPWU), PKSU = KUH(TCUkTU) and CU =H(IDUkKUkTCUkTU). Then,
U sends the login request messageMU = hTIDU, CU, PKSU, TUi to GW.
Assume an attacker A who has obtained the information {H(), TIDU, TEU, PTCU, r} stored
on the smart card of user U. A eavesdrops and obtains the login request messageMU = hTIDU,
CU, PKSU, TUi, and mounts the following offline dictionary attack.
Step 1. Amakes a guess PW 0U on the password PWU and computes TC
0
U ¼ PTCU 
HðrkPW 0U Þ and K 0U ¼ PKSU  HðTC0UkTU Þ.
Step 2. For each possible identity ID0U , A computes C
0
U ¼ HðID0UkK 0UkTC0UkTU Þ and verifies
the correctness of PW 0U and ID
0
U by checking that C
0
U is equal to CU. Note that, with an
overwhelming probability, C0U ¼ CU if and only if PW 0U ¼ PWU and ID0U ¼ IDU .
Step 3. A repeats Steps 1 and 2 until the correct password and identity are found.
This dictionary attack works because the identity space is very limited in practice, being usu-
ally even smaller than the password space [28, 29]. All other schemes using only lightweight
cryptographic techniques are also vulnerable to similar dictionary attacks, as shown in [28, 29].
Note that simply using a symmetric encryption scheme cannot overcome the inherent failure.
Although there are some published schemes that employ elliptic curve cryptography [6, 12,
20], these schemes were designed with no user anonymity in the first place and moreover, are
not efficient in the sense that they impose expensive scalar-point multiplications on resource-
constrained sensors.
In this paper, we present an efficient and provably-anonymous SCA-WSN scheme that re-
quires sensors to perform only lightweight cryptographic operations. Our scheme employs el-
liptic curve cryptography but restricts its use to anonymous user-to-gateway authentication in
order not to impose any (expensive) public-key operations, such as scalar-point multiplications
and map-to-point operations, on sensors. We formally prove that our scheme achieves user an-
onymity as well as authenticated key exchange in an extension of the widely accepted model of
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Bellare et al. [30]. In proving the security properties, we assume that the cryptographic hash
functions used are random oracles and the elliptic curve computational Diffie-Hellman prob-
lem is computationally hard. The extended model captures not only the notion of two-factor
security but also standard attacks against SCA-WSN schemes like node capture attacks, privileged
insider attacks, and stolen verifier attacks.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes an extended securi-
ty model for the analysis of anonymous SCA-WSN schemes. Section 3 presents our proposed SCA-
WSN scheme along with cryptographic primitives on which the security of the scheme relies.
Section 4 provides proofs for the security properties of our proposed scheme in the extended
security model. Section 5 concludes the paper with a comparative efficiency and security of our
scheme and other SCA-WSN schemes.
A Security Model for Anonymous SCA-WSN Schemes
This section describes a security model extended from the Bellare et al.’s model [30] to analyze
authentication and key exchange protocols of anonymous SCA-WSN schemes. Our security
model captures the notion of two-factor security as well as the resistance to node capture at-
tacks, privileged insider attacks, stolen verifier attacks, and other common attacks. We provide
two security definitions associated with the model, one for authenticated key exchange and one
for user anonymity, which collectively define a secure, anonymous SCA-WSN scheme.
Participants
Let SN and U be the sets of all sensors and users, respectively, registered with the gateway GW.
Let E = U[SN[{GW}. We identify each entity E 2 E by a string, and interchangeably use E and
IDE to refer to this identifier string. To formally capture the user anonymity property, we as-
sume that: (1) each user U 2 U has its pseudo identity PIDU in addition to the true identity IDU
and (2) the adversaryA is given only PIDU but not IDU.
Protocol Executions
A user U 2may run multiple sessions of the authentication and key exchange protocol of a
SCA-WSN scheme, either serially or concurrently, to establish a session key with a sensor SN 2
SN via assistance of the gateway GW. Therefore, at any given time, there could be multiple in-
stances of the entities U, SN and GW. We usePiE to denote instance i of entity E 2 E. Instances
of U and SN are said to accept when they compute a session key in an execution of the protocol.
We denote the session key ofPiE by sk
i
E.
Long-Lived Keys
During the initialization of the protocol,
• each U 2 U chooses its password PWU from a fixed dictionary D, and
• GW generates its master secret(s), issues a smart card to each U 2 U, and shares a crypto-
graphic key with each SN 2 SN.
Partnering
Informally, two instances are said to be partners of each other if they participate together in the
same protocol session and as a result, compute the same session key. Formally, partnering be-
tween instances is defined in terms of the notion of session identifier. A session identifier (sid)
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is an identifier of a protocol session and is typically defined as a function of the messages ex-
changed in the session. Let sidiE denote the sid of instanceP
i
E . We say that two instances,P
i
U
andPjSN , are partners if (1) both the instances have accepted and (2) sid
i
U ¼ sidjSN .
Adversary Capabilities
We assume there exists an adversaryA running in a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) in the
security parameter κ, which represents the bit-length of session keys. We note that the size of
the dictionary D is a fixed constant that is independent of the security parameter κ. The PPT ad-
versaryA has complete control of all communications between entities, can request for access
to session keys and long-term keys, and can extract user’s information stored on the smart
card. These capabilities ofA are modeled via the following oracle queries which are allowed for
A to make.
• Execute(PiU ,P
j
SN ,P
k
GW ): This query models passive attacks against the protocol. It
prompts an execution of the protocol between the instancesPiU ,P
j
SN andP
k
GW , and outputs
the transcript of the protocol execution toA.
• Send(PiE;m): This query sends a messagem to an instanceP
i
E , modelling active attacks
against the protocol. Upon receivingm, the instancePiE proceeds according to the protocol
specification. The message output byPiE , if any, is returned toA. A query of the form
Send(PiU , start:hSN, GWi) promptsPiU to initiate a protocol session with instances of SN
and GW.
• Reveal(PiE): This query captures the notion of known key security. The instanceP
i
E , upon
receiving the query and if it has accepted, returns the session key, skiE , back toA.
• CorruptLLðUÞ=CorruptSCðUÞ: These queries together capture the notion of two-factor se-
curity. The former returns the password of U while the latter returns the information stored
in the smart card of U.
• CorruptLL(SN): This query returns the long-lived secret(s) of the sensor SN, modelling node
capture attacks.
• CorruptLL(GW), modelling privileged insider attacks.
• CorruptVFR(GW): This query returns the password verifiers stored by GW, modelling sto-
len verifier attacks.
• TestAKE(PiE): This query is used for determining whether the protocol achieves authenti-
cated key exchange or not. IfPiE has accepted, then depending on a random bit b chosen by
the oracle,A is given either the real session key skiE if b = 1 or a random key drawn from the
session-key space if b = 0.
• TestUA(U): This query is used for determining whether the protocol provides user anonym-
ity or not. Depending on a randomly chosen bit b,A is given either the identity actually used
for U in the protocol sessions (when b = 1) or a random identity drawn from the identity
space (when b = 0).
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CorruptLL queries all together also capture the notion of perfect forward secrecy. SN and
GW are said to be corrupted when they are asked a CorruptLL query while U is considered as
corrupted if it has been asked both CorruptLL and CorruptSC queries.
Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE)
The AKE security of an authentication and key exchange protocol P is defined via the notion of
freshness. Intuitively, a fresh instance is one that holds a session key which should not be
known to the adversaryA, and an unfresh instance is one whose session key (or some informa-
tion about the key) can be known by trivial means. A formal definition of freshness follows:
Definition 1 (Freshness). An instancePiE is fresh if none of the following occurs:
1. A queries RevealðPiEÞ or RevealðPjE0 Þ, wherePjE0 is the partner ofPiE .
2. A queries both CorruptLLðUÞ and CorruptSCðUÞ when U is E itself or the peer entity of E.
3. A queries CorruptLLðSNÞ when SN is E itself or the peer entity of E.
4. A queries CorruptLLðGW Þ.
Note that this definition of freshness is unable to capture the notion of perfect forward se-
crecy. (As explained in the next section, the authentication and key exchange protocol of our
scheme does not provide perfect forward secrecy.) The AKE security of protocol P is defined in
the context of the following two-stage experiment:
Experiment ExpAKE0:
Stage 1.Amakes any oracle queries at will, except that:
1. A is not allowed to make the TestAKE(PiE) query if the instancePiE is not fresh.
2. A is not allowed to make the Reveal(PiE) query if it has already made a TestAKE query
toPiE or its partner instance.
3. A is not allowed to access to the TestUA oracle.
Stage 2. OnceA decides that Stage 1 is over, it outputs a bit b0 as a guess on the hidden bit b
chosen by the TestAKE oracle.A is said to succeed if b = b0.
Let SuccAKE0 be the event thatA succeeds in the experiment ExpAKE0, and AdvAKEP ðAÞ
denote the advantage ofA in breaking the AKE security of protocol P. Then, we define
AdvAKEP ðAÞ ¼ 2  PrP;A½SuccAKE0  1.
Definition 2 (AKE Security). An authentication and key exchange protocol P is AKE-secure
if AdvAKEP ðAÞ is negligible for any PPT adversaryA.
User Anonymity
An authentication and key exchange protocol that does not provide user anonymity may still
be rendered AKE-secure. That is, the AKE security does not imply user anonymity. Therefore,
a new, separate definition is necessary to capture the user anonymity property. Our definition
of user anonymity is based on the notion of cleanness.
Definition 3 (Cleanness). A user U 2U is clean if none of the following occurs:
1. A queries both CorruptLLðUÞ and CorruptSCðUÞ.
2. A queries CorruptLLðGW Þ.
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Note that the definition of cleanness does not impose any restriction on making CorruptLL
queries to sensors. This reflects our objective to achieve user anonymity even against sensors.
User anonymity is formalized in the context of the following two-stage experiment:
Experiment ExpUA0:
Stage 1.Amakes any oracle queries at will, except that:
1. A is not allowed to make the TestUA(U) query if the user U is not clean.
2. A is not allowed to corrupt GW and U if it has already made the TestUAðUÞ query.
3. A is not allowed to access to the TestAKE oracle.
Stage 2. OnceA decides that Stage 1 is over, it outputs a bit b0 as a guess on the hidden bit b
chosen by the TestUA oracle.A is said to succeed if b = b0.
Let SuccUA0 be the event thatA succeeds in the experiment ExpUA0, and AdvUAP ðAÞ de-
note the advantage ofA in attacking the user anonymity of protocol P. Then, we define
AdvUAP ðAÞ ¼ 2  PrP;A½SuccUA0  1.
Definition 4 (User Anonymity). An authentication and key exchange protocol P provides
user anonymity if AdvUAP ðAÞ is negligible for any PPT adversaryA.
Our Proposed Scheme
Our SCA-WSN scheme restricts the use of elliptic curve cryptography to anonymous user-to-gate-
way authentication and thereby allows sensor nodes to perform only lightweight cryptographic
operations such as symmetric encryption/decryption, MAC generation/verification, and hash
function evaluation. We begin by describing the cryptographic building blocks on which the se-
curity of our scheme depends.
Building Blocks
Elliptic curve computational Diffie-Hellman (ECCDH) problem. Let G be an elliptic
curve group of prime order q. Typically, G will be a subgroup of the group of points on an ellip-
tic curve over a finite field. Any elliptic curve and finite field recommended by NIST [31] can
be used to instantiate the group G. The recent work of Choi et al. [20], for example, describes a
typical elliptic curve group of a prime order. Let P be a generator of G. The ECCDH problem
for G is to compute xyP 2 G when given two elements (xP,yP) 2 G2, where x; y2RZq. We say
that the ECCDH assumption holds for G if it is computationally infeasible to solve the ECCDH
problem for G. Let AdvECCDHG ðAÞ be the advantage of an algorithmA in solving the ECCDH
problem for G and be defined as AdvECCDHG ðAÞ ¼ Pr½AðG; P; xP; yPÞ ¼ xyP. We assume that
AdvECCDHG ðAÞ is negligible for all PPT algorithmsA (i.e., the ECCDH assumption holds in G).
We denote by AdvECCDHG ðtÞ the maximum value of AdvECCDHG ðAÞ over all algorithmsA running
in time at most t.
Message authentication code schemes. Amessage authentication code (MAC) scheme S
is a pair of efficient algorithms (Mac, Ver) where: (1) the MAC generation algorithmMac
takes as input an ‘-bit key k and a messagem, and outputs a MAC σ; and (2) the MAC verifica-
tion algorithm Ver takes as input a key k, a messagem, and a MAC σ, and outputs 1 if σ is valid
for messagem under the key k or outputs 0 if σ is invalid. We require that S should achieve the
strong existential unforgeability against chosen message attacks. To formally define this re-
quirement, let AdvEFCMAS ðAÞ be the probability that an adversaryA, who mounts an adaptive
chosen message attack against S with oracle access toMackðÞ and VerkðÞ, outputs a message/
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tag pair (m, σ) such that: (1) Verkðm; sÞ ¼ 1 and (2) σ has not been output by the oracle
MackðÞ as a MAC on the messagem. The, we say that the MAC scheme S is secure if
AdvEFCMAS ðAÞ is negligible for every PPT adversaryA. We use AdvEFCMAS ðtÞ to denote the
maximum value of AdvEFCMAS ðAÞ over all adversariesA running in time at most t.
Cryptographic hash functions. Let κ be the bit-length of session keys, ‘ be as defined for
S, and ω be the bit-length of EIDU (see the registration phase of our scheme described in the
next section). Then, our scheme uses three cryptographic hash functions H:{0, 1} ! {0, 1}κ, J:
{0, 1} ! {0, 1}‘, and I:{0, 1} ! {0, 1}ω. These hash functions are modelled as random oracles
in our security proofs.
Symmetric encryption schemes. A symmetric encryption scheme Δ is a pair of efficient
algorithms (Enc, Dec) where: (1) the encryption algorithm Enc takes as input an ‘-bit key k
and a plaintext messagem, and outputs a ciphertext c; and (2) the decryption algorithm Dec
takes as input a key k and a ciphertext c, and outputs a messagem. For an eavesdropping adver-
saryA against Δ, and for an integer n 1 and a random bit b 2 R{0, 1}, consider the following
indistinguishability experiment where only a single encryption key is used:
ExperimentExpINDSEKD ðA; n; bÞ
k 2R {0, 1}‘
for i = 1 to n
(mi, 0,mi,1) A(Δ)
ci  Enckðmi;bÞ
A(ci)
b0  A, where b0 2 {0, 1}
return b0
We use AdvINDSEKD ðAÞ to denote the advantage ofA in violating the indistinguishability of
Δ in experiment ExpINDSEKD ðA; n; bÞ, and define it as
AdvINDSEKD ðAÞ ¼ jPr½ExpINDSEKD ðA; n; 0Þ ¼ 1  Pr½ExpINDSEKD ðA; n; 1Þ ¼ 1j:
We say that the symmetric encryption scheme Δ is secure if AdvINDSEKD ðAÞ is negligible for
every PPT eavesdropperA. Let AdvINDSEKD ðtÞ be the maximum value of AdvINDSEKD ðAÞ over all
A running in time at most t.
We now claim that if a symmetric encryption scheme is secure with respect to a single en-
cryption key, then it is also secure with respect to multiple encryption keys. Now consider the
following indistinguishability experiment where d encryption keys are used:
ExperimentExpINDSEKD ðA; n; d; bÞ
for i = 1 to d
ki 2R {0, 1}‘
for j = 1 to n
(mi,j,0,mi,j,1) A(Δ)
ci;j  Enckiðmi;j;bÞ
A(ci,j)
b0  A, where b0 2 {0, 1}
return b0
We define AdvINDMEKD ðAÞ and AdvINDMEKD ðtÞ respectively as
AdvINDMEKD ðAÞ ¼ jPr½ExpINDMEKD ðA; n; d; 0Þ ¼ 1  Pr½ExpINDMEKD ðA; n; d; 1Þ ¼ 1j
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and
AdvINDMEKD ðtÞ ¼maxA fAdv
INDMEK
D ðAÞg;
where the maximum is over allA running in time at most t.
Lemma 1. For any symmetric encryption scheme Δ,
AdvINDMEKD ðtÞ  d  AdvINDSEKD ðtÞ;
where d is as defined for experiment ExpINDMEKD ðA; n; d; bÞ.
Proof. Assume an adversaryA who attacks the indistinguishability of Δ in
ExpINDMEKD ðA; n; d; bÞ with time complexity t. The proof proceeds with a standard hybrid ar-
gument [32]. Consider a sequence of d + 1 hybrid experiments ExpINDMEKD;x ðA; n; d; bÞ, 0 ξ
 d, where eachExpINDMEKD;x ðA, n, d, b) is different from ExpINDMEKD ðA; n; d; bÞ only in that
each ci,j is set as follows:
ci;j  
Enckiðmi;j;1Þ if i  x
Enckiðmi;j;0Þ otherwise:
8<
:
The experimentsExpINDMEKD;0 ðA; n; d; bÞ andExpINDMEKD;d ðA; n; d; bÞ at the extremes of the se-
quence are identical to the experiments ExpINDMEKD ðA; n; d; 0Þ and ExpINDMEKD ðA; n; d; 1Þ,
respectively. As we move fromExpINDMEKD;x1 ðA; n; d; bÞ toExpINDMEKD;x ðA; n; d; bÞ in the se-
quence, we change the n ciphertexts cξ,1, . . ., cξ,n from encryptions of the first plaintexts to en-
cryptions of the second plaintexts. Since there are d such moves fromExpINDMEKD;0 ðA; n; d; bÞ
toExpINDMEKD;d ðA; n; d; bÞ, the inequality of the lemma follows immediately if we prove that
the difference between the probabilities thatA outputs 1 in any two neighboring experiments
ExpINDMEKD;x1 ðA; n; d; bÞ andExpINDMEKD;x ðA; n; d; bÞ is at most AdvINDSEKD ðtÞ. That is, to com-
plete the proof, it suffices to show that for any 1 ξ d,
jPr½ExpINDMEKD;x1 ðA; n; d; bÞ ¼ 1  Pr½ExpINDMEKD;x ðA; n; d; bÞ ¼ 1j  AdvINDSEKD ðtÞ: ð1Þ
Let  ¼j Pr½ExpINDMEKD;x1 ðA; n; d; bÞ ¼ 1  Pr½ExpINDMEKD;x ðA; n; d; bÞ ¼ 1 j. Then, to prove
Equation 1, we will construct, fromA, an adversaryAξ who attacks the indistinguishability of
Δ in ExpINDSEKD ðA; n; bÞ with advantage .
Aξ begins by invoking adversaryA, then proceeds to simulate the indistinguishability ex-
periment forA, and finally ends by outputting whatever bitA eventually outputs. In the simu-
lated experiment,Aξ generates the ciphertexts exactly as in the hybrid experiment
ExpINDMEKD;x ðA; b; nÞ except that it generates cξ,1, . . ., cξ,n as follows:
WhenA outputs the n plaintext pairs (mξ,1,0,mξ,1,1), . . ., (mξ,n,0,mξ,n,1),Aξ outputs them as
its own plaintext pairs in experiment ExpINDSEKD ðAx; n; bÞ, receives in return the cipher-
texts c1, . . ., cn, and sets cξ,1 = c1, . . ., cξ,n = cn.
Then, it follows that:
• the probability thatAξ outputs 1 when the given ciphertexts are the encryptions of
the first plaintexts is equal to the probability thatA outputs 1 in the experiment
ExpINDMEKD;x1 ðA; n; d; bÞ, and
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• the probability thatAξ outputs 1 when the given ciphertexts are the encryptions of the sec-
ond plaintexts is equal to the probability thatA outputs 1 in the experiment
ExpINDMEKD;x ðA; n; d; bÞ.
That is:
AdvINDSEKD ðAxÞ ¼ jPr½ExpINDMEKD;x1 ðA; n; d; bÞ ¼ 1  Pr½ExpINDMEKD;x ðA; n; d; bÞ ¼ 1j:
SinceAξ has time complexity t, it follows that AdvINDSEKD ðAxÞ  AdvINDSEKD ðtÞ by definition.
This completes the proof of Equation 1 and hence the proof of Lemma 1.
Description of the Scheme
The scheme consists of three phases: the registration phase, the authentication and key ex-
change phase, and the password update phase. During the system initialization, the gateway
GW determines the following public parameters: (1) an elliptic curve group G with a generator
P of prime order q, (2) a MAC scheme S ¼ ðMac;VerÞ, (3) a symmetric encryption scheme
D ¼ ðEnc;DecÞ, and (4) three hash functionsH, J and I. We assume that these parameters are
known to all parties in the network including the adversaryA. As part of the system initializa-
tion, GW chooses two master secrets y 2 Zq and z 2 {0, 1}‘, computes its public key Y = yP,
and shares a secret key kGS = J(IDSNkz) with each sensor SN.
Registration phase. A user U should register itself with the gateway GW before it can ever
gain access to the sensor network and data. The registration proceeds as follows:
1. U chooses its identity IDU and password PWU at will, and submits the identity IDU to GW
via a secure channel.
2. GW computes EIDU ¼ EnczðIDUkIDGW Þ and issues U a smart card loaded with {EIDU, Y,
IDGW, G, P, S, Δ, H, J, I}. (We assume that q is implicit in G.)
3. U replaces EIDU with XEIDU = EIDUI(IDUkPWU).
Authentication and key exchange phase. U needs to perform this phase with SN and GW
whenever it wishes to access to the sensor network and data. The steps of the phase are depicted
in Fig. 1 and are described as follows:
Step 1. U inserts its smart card into a card reader and inputs its identity IDU and password
PWU. Then, the smart card retrieves the current timestamp TU, selects two random x 2 Zq
and kUS 2 {0, 1}κ, and computes
X ¼ xP;
KUG ¼ xY ;
kUG ¼ JðTU k X k Y k KUGÞ;
EIDU ¼ XEIDU  IðIDU k PWUÞ;
CU ¼ EnckUGðIDU k EIDU k kUSÞ;
sU ¼ MackUGðIDGW k IDSN k TU k CUÞ:
After the computations, the smart card sends the messageM1 = hTU,IDSN,X,CU,σUi to the
gateway GW.
Step 2. GW rejects the messageM1 (and aborts the session) if TU is not fresh. Otherwise, GW
computes KUG = yX and kUG = J(TUkXkYkKUG), and checks if VerkUGðIDGWkIDSNk
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Fig 1. Our proposed authentication and key exchange protocol for wireless sensor networks.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0116709.g001
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TUkCU,σU) = 1. If the check fails, GW aborts the session. Otherwise, GW decrypts CU with
key kUG and then EIDU with key z, and checks if the decryption of EIDU yields the same IDU
as produced through the decryption of CU. If only the two IDs match, GW retrieves the cur-
rent timestamp TGW, computes
CGW ¼ EnckGSðkUSÞ;
sGW ¼ MackGSðIDGW k IDSN k TGW k TU k CGWÞ;
and sends the messageM2 = hIDGW,TGW,TU,CGW,σGWi to the sensor SN.
Step 3. Upon receivingM2, SN verifies that (1) TGW is fresh and (2) VerkGS ðIDGWkIDSNkTGWk
TUkCGW,σGW) = 1. If any of the verifications fails, SN aborts the session. Otherwise, SN de-
crypts CGW to obtain kUS and computes the session key sk and the authenticator ρSN as
follows:
sk ¼ HðkUS k TU k IDSNÞ;
rSN ¼ HðkUS k IDSN k TUÞ:
Then, SN sends the messageM3 = hρSNi to the user U.
Step 4. WithM3 in hand, U checks if ρSN is equal toH(kUSkIDSNkTU). U aborts the session if
the check fails or otherwise computes the session key sk =H(kUSkTUkIDSN).
Password update phase. One of the recommended guidelines for achieving better pass-
word security is to enforce regular password updates. In our scheme, users can change their
passwords either non-interactively or interactively. The non-interactive password change pro-
cedure proceeds as follows:
1. U inserts his smart card into a card reader and enters the identity IDU, the current password
PWU, and the new password PW 0U .
2. The smart card computes XEID0U ¼ XEIDU  IðIDUkPWU Þ  IðIDUkPW 0U Þ and replaces
XEIDU with XEID0U .
Although this procedure is simple and non-interactive, it may render the smart card unus-
able if the user enters a wrong password by mistake or an adversary intentionally inputs an ar-
bitrary password after gaining temporary access to the smart card. When an invalid password
is entered, subsequent login requests of the user will be rejected unless it reregisters with the
gateway. This problem can be addressed by storing a password verifier on the smart card,
which is used to check the correctness of the user-given password. However, as soon as the
smart card contains a password verifier, the scheme becomes vulnerable to an offline dictionary
attack under the non-tamper-resistance assumption of smart cards and, consequently, fails to
achieve two-factor security. This is clearly unacceptable and, therefore, we suggest the follow-
ing interactive password change procedure.
1. U inserts his smart card into a card reader and enters the identity IDU, the current password
PWU, and the new password PW 0U .
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2. The smart card retrieves the current timestamp TU, selects a random x 2 Zq, and computes
X ¼ xP;
KUG ¼ xY ;
kUG ¼ JðTU k X k Y k KUGÞ;
EIDU ¼ XEIDU  IðIDU k PWUÞ;
CU ¼ EnckUGðIDU k EIDUÞ:
The smart card sends a password update request hTU,X,CUi to the gateway GW.
3. GW rejects the request if TU is not fresh. Otherwise, GW computes KUG = yX and kUG = J
(TUkXkYkKUG), decrypts CU with key kUG and then EIDU with key z, and checks whether
the two decryptions return the same IDU. If the check succeeds, GW computes ρGW =H
(IDGWkIDUkXkkUG) and sends it to the smart card. Otherwise, GW sends a failure message
to the smart card.
4. The smart card aborts the password change procedure if it receives a failure message or ρGW
is not equal to H(IDGWkIDUkXkkUG). Otherwise, it sets XEIDU ¼ EIDU  IðIDUkPW 0U Þ.
This interactive password change procedure provides a secure yet practical way of updating
user password, though it is more expensive than the non-interactive one.
Performance and Security Comparison
In Table 1, we provide a comparative summary between our scheme and other SCA-WSN
schemes both in terms of computation and security. As shown in the table, our scheme requires
the sensor SN to perform only lightweight cryptographic operations while enjoying provable
anonymity in an extension of the widely accepted model of Bellare et al. [30]. While the recent
schemes of Shi & Gong [12] and Choi et al. [20] provide forward secrecy, they impose 2 scalar-
Table 1. A comparative summary of smart-card-based user authentication schemes for wireless sensor networks.
Scheme Computation Security
SN U+SN+GW SKS UA FS RSSC RNC
Jiang et al. [19] 5H 22H Yes No No No Yes
Khan & Kumari [18] 7H 3E+20H Yes No No No Yes
Kim et al. [17] 2H 18H Yes No No No Yes
Chi et al. [16] 2E+1A+1H 4E+1A+5H Yes No No No Yes
He et al. [15] 2E+1H 10E+7H Yes No No No Yes
Kumar et al. [14] 2E+1H 7E+8H Yes No No No Yes
Li et al. [13] 6H 26H Yes No No No Yes
Xue et al. [11] 6H 22H Yes No No No Yes
Vaidya et al. [10] 2H 15H Yes No No No No [17]
Our scheme 1E+1A+2H 3M+5E+4A+7H Yes Proven No Yes Yes
Choi et al. [20] 2M+5H 6M+18H Yes No Yes No Yes
Shi & Gong [12] 2M+4H 6M+15H No [20] No Yes No Yes
Yeh et al. [6] 2M+1P+2H 8M+2P+9H No [33] No No [33] No Yes
SKS: session key security; UA: user anonymity; FS: forward secrecy; RSSC: resistance to stolen smart card attacks; RNC: resistance to node
capture attacks. M: scalar-point multiplication; P: map-to-point operation; E: symmetric encryption/decryption; A: MAC generation/verification; H: hash
function evaluation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0116709.t001
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point multiplications on the resource-constrained sensor SN. Note that scalar-point multiplica-
tion is much more expensive than the lightweight cryptographic operations considered in the
table, such as symmetric encryption/decryption, MAC generation/verification, and hash func-
tion evaluation. Moreover, these two schemes fail to achieve user anonymity despite their use
of elliptic curve cryptography. The schemes presented in [10, 11, 13–19] are computationally
efficient, but suffer from the inherent failure of user anonymity. To the best of our knowledge,
all existing SCA-WSN schemes fall into one of the two classes.
According to Crypto++ 5.6.0 benchmarks that ran on an Intel Core 2 1.83 GHz processor
under Windows Vista in 32-bit mode, SHA-1 and HMAC take 11.4 and 11.9 cycles per byte re-
spectively; while AES (with 128-bit key) takes 12.6 to 16.9 cycles per byte, depending on the op-
eration mode used—see Table 2 and we refer interested readers to http://www.cryptopp.com/
benchmarks.html for Crypto++ benchmarks for commonly used cryptographic algorithms.
Our scheme requires the sensor SN to perform 1E+1A+2H operations which amount to
about 4.5H operations. Therefore, in terms of computational requirements for SN, our scheme
is comparable with other SCA-WSN schemes [11, 13–16, 18, 19] using only lightweight crypto-
graphic techniques. Although the schemes of Vaidya et al. [10] and Kim et al. [17] require SN
to perform only 2 hash function evaluations, these schemes do not achieve user anonymity and
are vulnerable to a stolen smart card attack. Under the non-tamper-resistance assumption of
smart cards, our scheme is the only one that provides user anonymity and resists stolen smart
card attacks.
Security Proofs
We now prove that the authentication and key exchange protocol of our scheme is AKE-secure
(in the sense of Definition 2) and provides user anonymity (in the sense of Definition 4). Recall
that the security model described in Section 2 captures various SCA-WSN specific attacks (such as
stolen smart card attacks, node capture attacks, privileged insider attacks, and stolen verifier at-
tacks) as well as other common attacks (like impersonation attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks,
replay attacks, and known key attacks) [21, 23, 25, 34]. Before providing formal security proofs
in the model, we briefly discuss the security of our scheme against SCA-WSN specific attacks.
Stolen smart card attacks. Our scheme does not require a password verifier to be stored on
the smart card of user U. Moreover, even if an adversary managed to obtain the ciphertext
CU ¼ EnckUGðIDUkEIDUkkUSÞ, the adversary would be unable to exploit CU as a password
verifier since, under the ECCDH assumption, it is infeasible to compute kUG = J
(TUkXkYkKUG) from X and Y. Thus, our scheme is resistant against stolen smart card
attacks.
Node capture attacks. In our scheme, each sensor node SN holds its individual secret key
kGS = J(IDSNkz) which is shared only with the gateway GW. In other words, different sensor
nodes have different secret keys (with an overwhelming probability). Thus, the secret key
kGS obtained by capturing a sensor node SN will be of no use in impersonating another
Table 2. Crypto++ 5.6.0 benchmarks for SHA-1, HMAC and AES.
Algorithm SHA-1 HMAC (SHA-1) AES (with 128-bit key)
CTR CBC OFB CFB ECB
Cycles Per Byte 11.4 11.9 12.6 16.0 16.9 16.1 16.0
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0116709.t002
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sensor node SN0 who holds a secret key other than kGS. Therefore, node capture attacks are
not possible against our scheme.
Privileged insider attacks. A privileged insider attack occurs when the gateway administrator
can access a user’s password to impersonate the user. In our scheme, the gateway GW re-
ceives no password-related information from the user U and does not manage any table for
storing such information. It is thus clear that privileged insider attacks cannot be mounted
against our scheme.
Stolen verifier attacks. In a stolen verifier attack, the adversary attempts to impersonate a legit-
imate user by stealing the user’s password verifier stored on the gateway GW. However, in
our scheme, GW does not store a password verifier of any kind but stores only two master
secrets y and z which are selected independently of user passwords. Hence, our scheme is se-
cure against stolen verifier attacks.
User Anonymity
Theorem 1. Our authentication and key exchange protocol, P, provides user anonymity in the
random oracle model under the ECCDH assumption in G and the security of the symmetric en-
cryption scheme Δ.
Proof. LetA be a PPT adversary against the user anonymity property of protocol P. We prove
the theorem by making a series of modifications to the original experiment ExpUA0, bounding
the difference in the success probability ofA between two consecutive experiments, and ending
up with an experiment whereA has a success probability of 1/2 (i.e.,A has no advantage). Let
SuccUAi denote the event thatA correctly guesses the hidden bit b chosen by the TestUA or-
acle in experiment ExpUAi. Let tiUA be the maximum time required to perform the experiment
ExpUAi involving the adversaryA.
Experiment ExpUA1. In this experiment, we simulate the random oracle J as follows:
Simulation of the J oracle: For each J query on a string str, the simulator first checks if an
entry of the form (str,j) is in a list called JList which contains all the input-output pairs of J. If
such an entry exists in JList, the simulator returns j as the output of the J query. Otherwise, the
simulator chooses a random ‘-bit string j0, returns j0 in response to the query, and adds the
entry (str,j0) to JList.
For all other oracle queries ofA, the simulator answers them as in the original experiment
ExpUA0. Then, ExpUA1 is perfectly indistinguishable from ExpUA0 and therefore, Claim
1 holds.
Claim 1. PrP;A½SuccUA1 ¼ PrP;A½SuccUA0.
Experiment ExpUA2. Here, we modify the experiment so that X is computed as follows:
The ExpUA2 modification:
• The simulator chooses a random exponent a 2 Zq and computes A = aP.
• For each user instance, the simulator chooses a random r 2 Zq and sets X = rA.
As a result of the modification, each KUG is set to rayP for some random r 2 Zq. Since the
view ofA is identical between ExpUA2 and ExpUA1, it follows that:
Claim 2. PrP;A½SuccUA2 ¼ PrP;A½SuccUA1.
Experiment ExpUA3. We next modify the computations of X and Y as follows:
The ExpUA3 modification:
• The simulator chooses two random elements A, B 2 G and sets Y = B.
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• For each instance of clean users, the simulator chooses a random r 2 Zq and sets X = rA. For
other instances, the simulator computes X as in experiment ExpUA2.
• For each instance of clean users, the simulator sets each kUG to a random ‘-bit string. For
other instances, the simulator computes kUG as in experiment ExpUA2.
Since kUG is set to a random ‘-bit string (for instances of clean users), the success probability
ofAmay be different between ExpUA3 and ExpUA2 if it makes an J(TUkXkYkKUG) query.
However, this difference is bounded by Claim 3.
Claim 3. j PrP;A½SuccUA3  PrP;A½SuccUA2 j 1=qJ  AdvECCDHG ðt3UAÞ, where qJ is the
number of queries made to the J oracle.
Proof. We prove the claim via a reduction from the ECCDH problem which is believed to be
hard. Assume that the success probability ofA is non-negligibly different between ExpUA3
and ExpUA2. Then we construct an algorithmAECCDH that solves the ECCDH problem in G
with a non-negligible advantage. The objective ofAECCDH is to compute and output the value
W = uvP 2 G when given an ECCDH-problem instance (U = uP, V = vP) 2 G2.AECCDH runs
A as a subroutine while simulating all the oracles on its own.
AECCDH handles all the oracle queries ofA as specified in experiment ExpUA3 but using U
and V in place of X and Y. WhenA outputs its guess b0,AECCDH chooses an entry of the form
(TUkXkYkK,j) at random from JList and terminates outputting K/r. From the simulation, it is
clear thatAECCDH outputs the desired resultW = uvP with probability at least 1/qJ ifAmakes
a J(TUkXkYkKUG) query for some instance of a clean user U 2 U. This completes the proof of
Claim 3.
Experiment ExpUA4. We finally modify the experiment so that, for each clean user U 2 U,
a random identity ID0U drawn from the identity space is used in place of the true identity IDU in
generating CU.
Claim 4. j PrP;A½SuccUA4  PrP;A½SuccUA3 j AdvINDMEKD ðt4UAÞ.
Proof. We prove the claim by constructing an eavesdropping adversaryAIND-MEK who
attacks the indistinguishability of Δ in ExpINDMEKD ðA; n; d; bÞ with advantage equal to
jPrP;A½SuccUA4  PrP;A½SuccUA3 j (see Section 1 for details of experiment
ExpINDMEKD ðA; n; d; bÞ).
AIND-MEK begins by choosing a random bit b 2 {0, 1}. Then,AIND-MEK invokes the adver-
saryA and answers all the oracle queries ofA as in experiment ExpUA3 except that, for each
clean user U 2U, it generates CU by accessing its own encryption oracle as follows:
AIND-MEK outputs ðIDUkEIDUkkUS ; ID0UkEIDUkkUSÞ as the first plaintext-pair in the indis-
tinguishability experiment ExpINDMEKD . Let c1 be the ciphertext received in return for the
first pair.AIND-MEK sets CU equal to the ciphertext c1.
That is,AIND-MEK sets CU to the encryption of either IDUkEIDUkkUS or ID0UkEIDUkkUS.
Now whenA terminates and outputs its guess b0,AIND-MEK outputs 1 if b = b0, and 0 otherwise.
Then, it is clear that:
• the probability thatAIND-MEK outputs 1 when the first plaintexts are encrypted in the experi-
ment ExpINDMEKD is equal to the probability thatA succeeds in the experiment
ExpUA3, and
• the probability thatAIND-MEK outputs 1 when the second plaintexts are encrypted in the ex-
perimentExpINDMEKD is equal to the probability thatA succeeds in the experiment
ExpUA4.
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That is, AdvINDMEKD ðAINDMEKÞ ¼j PrP;A½SuccUA4  PrP;A½SuccUA3 j. Note that in the sim-
ulation,AIND-MEK eavesdrops at most qsend encryptions which is polynomial in the security pa-
rameter ‘. This completes the proof of Claim 4.
In the experiment ExpUA4, the adversaryA gains no information on the hidden bit b cho-
sen by the TestUA oracle because the identities of all clean users are chosen uniformly at ran-
dom from the identity space. It, therefore, follows that PrP;A½SuccUA4 ¼ 1=2. This result
combined with Claims 1–4 yields the statement of Theorem 1.
AKE Security
Theorem 2. As long as the MAC scheme S and the symmetric encryption scheme Δ are both se-
cure, our authentication and key exchange protocol P is secure in the random oracle model
under the ECCDH assumption in G.
Proof. Fix a PPT adversaryA against the security of the protocol P. To prove the theorem, we
make a series of modifications to the original experiment ExpAKE0, bounding the effect of
each change in the experiment on the success probability ofA and ending up with an experi-
ment whereA has a success probability of 1/2. We use SuccAKEi to denote the event that
A correctly guesses the hidden bit b chosen by the Test oracle in experiment ExpAKEi.
Let tiAKE be the maximum time required to perform the experiment ExpAKEi involving the
adversaryA.
Experiment ExpAKE1. This experiment is different from ExpAKE0 in that the random
oracle J is simulated as follows:
Simulation of the J oracle: For each J query on a string str, the simulator first checks if an
entry of the form (str,j) is in a list called JList which contains all the input-output pairs of J. If
such an entry exists in JList, the simulator returns j as the output of the J query. Otherwise, the
simulator chooses a random ‘-bit string j0, returns j0 in response to the query, and adds the
entry (str,j0) to JList.
The other oracle queries ofA are answered as in the original experiment ExpAKE0. Then,
since J is a random oracle, ExpAKE1 is perfectly indistinguishable from ExpAKE0, and Claim 5
immediately follows.
Claim 5. PrP;A½SuccAKE1 ¼ PrP;A½SuccAKE0.
Experiment ExpAKE2. Here, we modify the experiment so that X is computed as follows:
The ExpAKE2 modification:
• The simulator chooses a random exponent a 2 Zq and computes A = aP.
• For each instance of users, the simulator chooses a random r 2 Zq and sets X = rA.
As a result, each KUG is set to rayP for some random r 2 Zq. Since the view ofA is identical
between ExpAKE2 and ExpAKE1, it follows that:
Claim 6. PrP;A½SuccAKE2 ¼ PrP;A½SuccAKE1.
Experiment ExpAKE3. We further modify the experiment as follows:
The ExpAKE3 modification:
• The simulator chooses two random elements A,B 2 G and sets Y = B.
• For each fresh instance, the simulator chooses a random r 2 Zq and sets X = rA. For other in-
stances, the simulator computes X as in experiment ExpAKE2.
• For each fresh instance, the simulator sets each kUG to a random ‘-bit string. For other in-
stances, the simulator computes kUG as in experiment ExpAKE2.
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Since kUG is set to a random ‘-bit string (for fresh instances), the success probability ofA
may be different between ExpAKE2 and ExpAKE3 if it makes an J(TUkXkYkKUG) query. This
difference is bounded by Claim 7.
Claim 7 j PrP;A½SuccAKE3  PrP;A½SuccAKE2 j 1=qJ  AdvECCDHG ðt3AKEÞ, where qJ is the
number of queries made to the J oracle.
Proof. We prove the claim via a reduction from the ECCDH problem which is believed to be
hard. Assume that the success probability ofA is non-negligibly different between ExpAKE2
and ExpAKE3. Then we construct an algorithmAECCDH that solves the ECCDH problem in G
with a non-negligible advantage. The objective ofAECCDH is to compute and output the value
W = uvP 2 G when given an ECCDH-problem instance (U = uP,V = vP) 2 G2.AECCDH runsA
as a subroutine while simulating all the oracles on its own.
AECCDH handles all the oracle queries ofA as specified in experiment ExpAKE3 but using
U and V in place of X and Y. WhenA outputs its guess b0,AECCDH chooses an entry of the
form (TUkXkYkK,j) at random from JList and terminates outputting K/r. From the simulation,
it is clear thatAECCDH outputs the desired resultW = uvP with probability at least 1/qJ ifA
makes a J(TUkXkYkKUG) query for some fresh instance of any U 2 U. This completes the proof
of Claim 7.
Experiment ExpAKE4. This experiment is different from ExpAKE3 in that it is aborted if
the following event Forge occurs.
Forge: The event that the adversaryAmakes a Send query that contains a MAC forgery.
Then we claim that:
Claim 8 j PrP;A½SuccAKE4  PrP;A½SuccAKE3 j qsend  AdvEFCMAS ðt4AKEÞ, where qsend is
the number of queries made to the Send oracle.
Proof. Assume that the event Forge occurs with a non-negligible probability. Then, we con-
struct an algorithm AEF who generates, with a non-negligible probability, a forgery against the
MAC scheme S. The algorithm AEF is is given access to theMackðÞ and VerkðÞ oracles. The
goal of AEF is to produce a message/MAC pair (m,σ) such that: (1) Verkðm; sÞ ¼ 1 and (2)
σ has not been output by the oracleMackðÞ on inputm.
Let n be the total number of MAC keys used in the sessions initiated via a Send query. AEF
begins by choosing a random i 2 {1, . . ., n}. Let ki denote the ith key among all the nMAC keys,
and Sendi be any Send query that is expected to be answered and/or verified using ki. AEF
runsA as a subroutine and answers the oracle queries ofA as in experiment ExpAKE3 except
that: it answers all Sendi queries by accessing itsMackðÞ and VerkðÞ oracles. As a result, the
ith MAC key ki is not used during the simulation. If Forge occurs against an instance who
holds AEF halts and outputs the message/MAC pair generated byA as its forgery. Otherwise,
AEF terminates with a failure indication.
If the guess i is correct, then the simulation is perfect and AEF achieves its goal. Namely,
AdvEFCMAS ðAEFÞ ¼ Pr½Forge=n. Since n qsend and AEF runs in time at most t4AKE , we get
Pr½Forge  qsend  AdvEFCMAS ðAEFÞ
 qsend  AdvEFCMAS ðt4AKEÞ:
This completes the proof of Claim 8.
Experiment ExpAKE5. We next modify the way of answering queries to the H oracle as fol-
lows:Simulation of theH oracle: For each H query on a string str, the simulator first checks if
an entry of the form (str,h) is in a list called HList which is maintained to store input-output
pairs ofH. If it is, h is the answer to the hash query. Otherwise, the simulator chooses a random
κ-bit string h0, answers the query with h0, and adds the entry (str,h0) to HList.
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The other oracle queries ofA are handled as in experiment ExpAKE4. Since ExpAKE5 is
perfectly indistinguishable from ExpAKE4, it is clear that:
Claim 9. PrP;A½SuccAKE5 ¼ PrP;A½SuccAKE4
Experiment ExpAKE6. We finally modify the experiment so that the session key sk is set to
a random κ-bit string for each fresh instance and its partner. Accordingly, the success probabil-
ity ofAmay be different between ExpAKE6 and ExpAKE5 if it asks an H query of the form H
(kUSkTUkIDSN) for some uncorrupted U 2 U and SN 2 SN. But the difference is bounded by:
Claim 10 j PrP;A½SuccAKE6  PrP;A½SuccAKE5 j 1qH  Adv
INDMEK
D ðt6AKEÞ, where qH is the
number of queries made to the H oracle.
Proof. We prove the claim by constructing an eavesdropperAIND-MEK who attacks the
indistinguishability of Δ in experiment ExpINDMEKD ðA; n; d; bÞ.AIND-MEK invokes the adver-
saryA and answers all the oracle queries ofA as in experiment ExpAKE5 except that it gener-
ates each CGW to be sent to a fresh sensor instance by accessing its own encryption oracle as
follows:
Let k 0US 6¼ kUS be a random string chosen from {0, 1}κ.AIND-MEK outputs ðkUS ; k 0USÞ as a
plaintext pair in the indistinguishability experiment ExpINDMEKD . Let c be the ciphertext
received in return for the plaintext pair.AIND-MEK sets CGW equal to the ciphertext c.
That is, each CGW is set to the encryption of either kUS or k0US. Now whenA terminates and
outputs its guess b0,AIND-MEK selects an entry of the form (kUSkTUkIDSN,h) at random from
HList and outputs 0 if k = kUS, and 1 otherwise. IfA asks anH query of the formH
(kUSkTUkIDSN) for some uncorrupted U 2 U and SN 2 SN,AIND-MEK correctly guesses the bit
b in its indistinguishability experiment with probability at least 1
qH
and therefore, Claim
10 follows.
In experiment ExpAKE6, the adversaryA obtains no information on the hidden bit b cho-
sen by the TestUA oracle since the session keys of all fresh instances are selected uniformly at
random from {0, 1}κ. Therefore, it follows that PrP;A½SuccUA4 ¼ 1=2. This result combined
with Claims 5–10 completes the proof of Theorem 2.
Concluding Remarks
With the continuing advancements in sensor technologies, WSNs will play an increasingly im-
portant role in commercial, government and military settings. A number of recent high profiles
such as the revelations by Edward Snowden that the US National Security Agency has been
conducting massive online surveillance of both US and non-US citizens highlighted the poten-
tial of ensuring user privacy and anonymity. In WSNs, for example, designing a secure and effi-
cient user authentication scheme without compromising user anonymity remains an area of
active research.
In this work, we have presented a SCA-WSN scheme, a smart-card-based user authentication
scheme for wireless sensor networks, which achieves user anonymity without imposing (expen-
sive) public key operations on sensors. Our result in this paper does not contradict the result of
Wang and Wang [28, 29] but rather supports and clarifies it: in order for a SCA-WSN scheme to
achieve user anonymity, the use of public key cryptography is inevitable but, if forward secrecy is
not desired, can be avoided at least on the sensor side. Extending our result to the case of three-
factor authentication [34] would be an interesting future work.
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